This page provides technical information about implementations that have been validated as conforming to the Key Agreement Schemes and/or Key Confirmation using Finite Field Cryptography (FFC) or Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) as specified in SP 800-56A, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, using tests described in The KAS Validation System (KASVS) User's Guide. The testing is handled by NVLAP-accredited Cryptographic And Security Testing (CST) Laboratories.
The implementations below consist of software, firmware, hardware, and any combination thereof. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has made every attempt to provide complete and accurate information about the implementations described in this document. However, due to the possibility of changes made within individual companies, NIST cannot guarantee that this document reflects the current status of each product. It is the responsibility of the vendor to notify NIST of any necessary changes to its entry in the following list.In addition to a general description of each implementation, this list mentions the features that were tested as conforming to the KAS; these features are listed below for each validation. The following notation is used to describe the implemented features that were successfully tested.
| ASSURANCES
[[5.5.2][ #1 #2 #3]] [[5.6.2.1][ #1 #2 #3 #4]] [[5.6.2.2][ #1 #2 #3]] [[5.6.2.3][ #1 #2 #3 #4]] [[5.6.3.1][#1 #2 #3 #4 #5]] [[5.6.3.2.1] [5.6.3.2.2]] | These assurances determine the scope of validation testing performed for an IUT. Please refer to the listed sections in SP800-56A for detailed descriptions of these assurances. If an assurance is not applicable for an IUT, it will not be listed. For example, if an implements Ephemeral scheme, all of the assurances pertaining to static keys will be not applicable. |
| ALG([FFC] [ECC]) | Finite Field Cryptography, Elliptic Curve Cryptography |
| For FFC, SCHEMES([HYBRID1] [MQV2] [EPHEM] [HYBRID1FLOW] [MQV1] [ONEFLOW] [STATIC]) For ECC, SCHEMES ([FULLUNIF] [FULLMQV] [EPHEMUNIF] [ONEPASSUNIF] [ONEPASSMQV] [ONEPASSDH] [STATICUNIF]) |
Key Agreement Schemes. Refer to SP800-56A for details on the specific schemes. |
| KAROLES([INITIATOR] [RESPONDER] | Key Agreement Roles |
| KCROLES([NA] [PROVIDER] [RECIPIENT]) | Key Confirmation Roles. If Key Confirmation is not tested, indicate N/A. |
| KCTYPES([NA] [UNILATERAL] [BILATERAL]) | Key Confirmation Types. If Key Confirmation is not tested, indicate N/A. |
| For FFC,
PARAMSET([FA] [FB] [FC]) For ECC,
|
Parameter Sets supported by IUT. Refer to Section 5.5.1.1 Table 1 for the FFC Parameter Size Sets and Section 5.5.1.2 Table 2 for the ECC Parameter Size Sets. |
| For ECC,
CURVE(....) |
The NIST-recommended ECDSA curves supported by the IUT. |
| SHA(SHA1 SHA224 SHA256 SHA384 SHA512) | Hash functions supported by the IUT |
| If KC,
MAC(CMAC, CCM, HMAC) |
Only if Key Confirmation is supported, indicate the MACing algorithms tested. |
The KAS validation process requires the following prerequisite testing:
1. The underlying DSA and/or ECDSA algorithm’s functions determined by the assurances implemented. See KASVS Table 1 for the required functions, if any,| Validation No. |
Vendor | Implementation | Operational Environment | Val. Date |
Description/Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4 | Renesas Technology America, Inc. 450 Holger Way San Jose, CA 95134 USA -Murthy Vedula
|
Version BOS_AE57C1_v_2.1_1012 (Firmware) Part # AE57C1, Version 19 |
Renesas AE57C1 | 10/9/2009 |
FFC:
(ASSURANCES
<
5.5.2:
#3
>
<
5.6.2.1:
#1
,
#4
>
<
5.6.2.2:
#1
,
#3
>
<
5.6.3.1:
,
#4
>
)
SCHEMES [ dhStatic ( KC: < KCRole(s): Recipient > < KCType(s): Unilateral > < KARole(s): Responder > ) ( FC: SHA256 HMAC ) ] SHS Val#982 RNG Val#585 "Renesas BOS software development framework is a mask ROM used for prototyping and mass production of embedded smart chip systems based on AE4XC/AE5XC/N2xx devices. BOS provides authentication and secure program download mechanism. Users can develop embedded applications using the BOS cryptographic, communication, and OS application interfaces." |
| 3 | Pitney Bowes, Inc. 35 Waterview Drive Shelton, CT 06484-8000 USA -Robert Sisson
|
Version 01.00.0004 (Firmware) |
Sigma ASIC | 8/17/2009 |
ECC: (
ASSURANCES
<
5.5.2:
#3
>
<
5.6.2.3:
#4
>
)
"The Pitney Bowes Cygnus X-3 Postal Security Device (PSD) is designed in compliance with FIPS 140-2 and IPMAR standards to support the USPS IBIP and international digital indicia standards globally. The PSD employs strong cryptographic and physical security techniques for the protection of customer funds in Pitney Bowes Postage Metering products." |
| 2 | Memory Experts International Inc. 227 Montcalm Suite 101 & 202 Gatineau, Quebec J8Y 3B9 Canada -Larry Hamid
|
Version 1.3 (Firmware) |
Bluefly Processor | 6/26/2009 |
FFC:
(ASSURANCES
<
5.5.2:
#3
>
<
5.6.2.3:
#1
>
)
SCHEMES [ dhEphem ( KARole(s): Responder ) ( FC: SHA256 ) ] SHS Val#1042 RNG Val#622 "The Bluefly processor is a cryptographic and authentication engine for Personal Portable Security Devices (PPSDs). It provides secure storage, digital identity functions, and multifactor user authentication for USB-based peripherals." |
| 1 | Pitney Bowes, Inc. 35 Waterview Drive Shelton, CT 06484-8000 USA -Robert Sisson
|
Version 03.00.0049 (Firmware) |
Sigma ASIC | 5/28/2009 |
ECC: (
ASSURANCES
<
5.5.2:
#3
>
<
5.6.2.3:
#4
>
)
"The Pitney Bowes Cygnus X-3 Postal Security Device (PSD) is designed in compliance with FIPS 140-2 and IPMAR standards to support the USPS IBIP and international digital indicia standards globally. The PSD employs strong cryptographic and physical security techniques for the protection of customer funds in Pitney Bowes Postage Metering products." |
Computer Security Division
National Institute of Standards and Technology